It has been long known that the human right hemisphere makes special contributions to the analysis of the emotional significance of facial expressions. Recent studies of brain damaged patients now show more precisely where and how the right hemisphere goes about doing so.
In the late 1800s, Jackson Hughlings [1] noted that the halting speech characteristic of aphasia that accompanied left hemisphere lesions was curiously attenuated when patients' vocalizations were laced with emotional vigor. This surprising spared fluency for offensive language is at once an amusing neurological anecdote as well as a landmark finding in human 'affective neuroscience' -the study of the neural basis of emotions. It provided early evidence that affective and cognitive operations may represent functionally dissociable entities, subserved by partially distinct neural systems in the human brain. Moreover, it demonstrated that the human cerebral hemispheres were not just divided by the lateral fissure, but also by the types of computation they are specialized to perform -with the right hemisphere appearing to differentially support communicative gestures or acts colored with emotional significance. Recent findings from patients with impaired abilities to evaluate emotional states from facial expressions have led to a more complete understanding of the right hemisphere's contribution to emotional processing, providing new insights into the neural basis of our larger emotional competence.
The great degree of correspondence between emotional processing deficits and lesions of right hemisphere origin have led to the 'right hemisphere dominance' theory of emotional processing [2, 3] , in which the right hemisphere is considered to be differentially involved in both the display [2] and evaluation [3] of emotional expressions. Despite the substantial consistency of the evidence supporting the view that the right hemisphere plays a dominant role in emotional processing, the apparent lack of intrahemispheric localization suggests that the entire right hemisphere may play an equally important part in emotional processing. In this respect, in this age of greater neuroanatomic specificity, the right hemisphere dominance theory of the neural substrates of emotional communication is somewhat unsatisfactory. This now appears to be changing. One source of this lack of specificity is that neuropsychological studies, by necessity, often collapse across lesions varying widely in extent and location. Given the rarity of group studies of patients with selective and homogenous lesions, the non-specifity of the right hemisphere dominance hypothesis is likely to be a product of this macroscopic level of analysis.
This state of affairs has been clarified by Adolphs et al.'s [4] recent comprehensive study of impairments in the evaluation of facial emotion in 108 patients with lesions varying widely in extent within each hemisphere (63 with lesions of the right and 60 with lesions of the left hemisphere, and 15 with bilateral lesions). When the lesions were analyzed as a function of task performance coregistered in a common brain space, joint volumetric lesion density indicated areas of damage most associated with facial emotion recognition impairment. This three-dimensional Venn diagram in brain space revealed a significant association between impairment and lesions within the right hemisphere. But the analysis went further than this: when the overlap was considered in patients with right hemisphere lesions that exhibited particular difficulty in comprehending the emotional significance of facial expressions, a 'hot spot' within somatosensory-related cortices was revealed, consisting specifically of the somatosensory cortices, S-I and S-II, the anterior supramarginal gyrus and the insular cortex ( Figure 1 ). Lesions of these regions were often accompanied by more diffuse damage; critically, individual patients with more selective damage restricted to somatosensory cortices also exhibited robust impairments. Follow-up analyses demonstrated that these impairments were correlated with tactile, but not motor deficits, suggesting the critical locus of damage was confined to the postcentral gyrus.
It may be surprising to find that a deficit in visual recognition of a specific object class is dependent on the integrity of somatosensory cortices, but this is consistent with the notion that impairments in the recognition of facial emotion are independent of the analysis of nonemotional facial dimensions [5] , and likely reflect a more fundamental deficit in emotional representation. These results dovetail nicely with the 'somatic-marker' hypothesis [6] , which asserts that somatosensory representations are an essential component of the generation of phenomenal affective states. The evaluation of facial displays of emotion may involve a recoding of visual input in the somatosensory cortex, in such a way that the observer is able to represent facial configurations parsed in the visual association areas in terms of 'affective space', overtly or covertly representing the actual feeling of the expressed emotion. This is consistent with other evidence that the viewing of facial displays is often accompanied by a form of emotional 'resonance' in the perceiver -invisible mimicry in the viewer's facial musculature [7] . Contemporary facial-feedback theories of emotional states, stemming from work of the philosopher William James early this century, assert that facial expressions are causally related to emotional experience, suggesting that experiential states may be the result of the feedback from such invisible emotion-specific muscle patterning in the face [8] . The evaluation of facial expressions may, then, critically depend upon a somatomotor decomposition of their appearance and the resulting affective resonance in the perceiver. Accordingly, the recent findings of Adolphs et al. [4] not only provide a significant refinement of the intrahemispheric localization of facial emotion recognition within the right hemisphere, but also provide a more fundamental understanding of the right hemisphere's particular contributions. Specifically, the dependence of the visual recognition of affective signals upon right hemisphere somatosensory cortices demonstrates that the appreciation of facial expressions is not merely a reflection of a categorical specialization within the ventral object processing stream, or of some global/configural visual processing advantage associated with the right hemisphere. Rather, this right hemisphere specialization for evaluating affective facial content appears to reflect our ability to map the portrayed expression directly onto one's internal representation of the corresponding emotional state. This has more than a superficial similarity to the motor theory of speech perception [9] . The motor theory suggests the comprehension of distal speech signals is intimately related to the proximal activation in the perceiver of motor gestures typically recruited in the speech act. Evolution has likely employed variations on a common solution for different forms of social communication, applying a similar algorithm to the even more abstract capacity to represent the internal mental states of others.
The findings of Adolphs et al. [4] also raise many questions, however. There are two sources of evidence in particular that may be at odds with this somatosensory account of emotion recognition: first is the evidence for dissociations between different affective communicative channels; and second, in contrast to the results reported by Adolphs et al. [4] , other findings demonstrate significant emotion-specificity of impairment. What we refer to as emotion is a constellation of sundry functions. These include subjective experience as well as its evaluation and expression via prosodic, gestural and lexical communicative channels. If lesions of the right hemisphere somatosensory cortex represent a more fundamental deficit in emotional competence, then we would expect such impairments should extend to all the various functions associated with emotional processing. This would to some extent be in contrast with our current understanding of how emotional communication is supported in the brain. For example, it has been shown that healthy adults exhibit correlations between receptive channels -that is, there is significant correspondence in proficiency in evaluating emotional state from facial, vocal or lexical sources within a normal individual -but these abilities become decoupled in patients with non-specific right hemisphere damage, with patients showing selective deficits for a particular channel [10] . We [11] have also shown dissociations between the recognition of emotion from vocal and facial sources following amygdala damage. More recently, we [12] have shown that, despite severely impaired recognition of facial expressions of fear associated with amygdala lesions, the ability to express fear with one's own face remains intact. Do such dissociations between different affective channels and between the comprehension and production of affective signals pose a problem for the affective resonance theory of emotion recognition?
Furthermore, the deficits associated with lesions of somatosensory-related cortices do not correspond to any one emotion type, but rather result in a global impairment in the evaluation of emotion from the face. Human emotion has been conceptualized as dependent on punctate 'basic' emotions, with independent representations for a restricted set of primary affects, such as fear, anger, happiness and so on [13] . Consonant with this view, recent studies have demonstrated significant emotion-specificity of neural representations, with subcortical structures, such as the amygdala, supporting the analysis of fear [14] , and cortical structures, such as the anterior insular region, supporting the analysis of disgust [15] . How does the view that the right hemisphere somatosensory cortices have a global role in emotion processing tally with this evidence for emotion-specificity of neural representations?
These contrasting results do not necessarily provide incompatible views of emotional organization in the brain, but likely reflect a complementary representational framework. The somatosensory-related cortices may be an affective convergence zone [16] -the sender and recipient of information from right hemisphere modules that represent multiple, functionally distinct affective maps at different levels of organization. For example, at one end of the structure-function spectrum, there may exist individuated neural representations for discrete emotion types -such as fear, happiness and so on -for different input-output modalities, and at higher levels of organization there may be amodal representations that are not specific to any particular emotion type. These non-specific representations may be supported by the right hemisphere somatosensory-related cortices.
There is some evidence to suggest the brain uses an affective representational scheme of this kind.
My colleagues and I [17] The true test of this hypothesis would be to show that only lesions encroaching upon right hemisphere somatosensoryrelated cortices result in high-level emotional functioning deficits, irrespective of input modality and output expression. If this prediction is borne out, neural representations seated within the right hemisphere somatosensory cortices would likely be responsible for the observed correlations among affective information-processing abilities in healthy adults. This brain region might be responsible for the elusive notion of our underlying emotional competence or 'emotional intelligence' [18] , postulated to promote sensitivity to the evaluation of one's own internal affective states as well as those portrayed by others. Deficits in the evaluation of facial expressions following somatosensoryrelated cortical damage would then be only symptomatic of a more fundamental deficit in emotional representation.
